Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 158062

64
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NCS - MR. POWER
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S E C R E T STATE 158062

E.O. 11652: GDS 12/31/79
TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT; MBFR: DEVELOPMENT OF ALLIED POSITION PAPER
REF; USNATO 3646, USNATO 3687, USNATO 3732

1. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR APPROPRIATE USE BY MISSION ON
VARIOUS QUESTIONS RAISED BY ALLIED REPS DURING AUG 1 AND
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SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 158062

3 NAC SESSIONS ABOUT THE US PAPER OF JULY 27. WE HOPE THIS

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

REPLY WILL HELP MISSION TO ADVANCE THE SPC FORMULATION OF
A COMMON ALLIANCE POSITION ON SUBSTANCE BY EARLY SEPTEMBER
DEADLINE ALREADY AGREED. INITIAL FOCUS OF SPC DISCUSSION
SHOULD BE SECTION TWO OF PROPOSED ALLIED PAPER WHICH SHOULD
EMERGE AS THE OVERALL ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION. WE HAVE
ALREADY ADDRESSED UK DESIRE TO POSTPONE ALLIED AGREEMENT
ON SPECIFIC ALLIED NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL IN STATE 152826.

2. ALLIED STRATEGY FOR INITIAL PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS: AS
INDICATED IN USNATO 3732 UK WILL LIKELY RAISE
QUESTIONS OF STRATEGY FOR NEGOTIATIONS DURING DISCUSSION OF
ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION. IT MAY WELL BE NECESSARY
TO REACH SOME PRELIMINARY UNDERSTANDINGS ON NEGOTIATING
STRATEGY FOR FIRST PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS EARLY IN SPC DIS-
CUSSION OF SUBSTANCE IN ORDER TO GAIN AGREEMENT OF UK AND
OTHERS TO OUR REDUCTION PROPOSAL. SUCH PARTIAL AGREEMENTS
ON STRATEGY FOR THE FIRST NEGOTIATING PHASE
SHOULD BE REGISTERED BUT PUT TO ONE SIDE FOR USE IN
SUBSEQUENT FORMULATION OF A STRATEGY SECTION OF OVERALL
ALLIED PAPER.

3. OUR OBJECTIVE IN DISCUSSING STRATEGY WOULD BE TO OBTAIN
ALLIED AGREEMENT TO ADVANCE FRAMEWORK VERSION OF PREFERRED
ALLIED POSITION EARLY IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOWING
DELIVERY OF OPENING STATEMENTS AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF
MAIN THEMES IN THOSE STATEMENTS. WASHINGTON AGENCIES
WILL DEVELOP US PROPOSAL COVERING STRATEGY FOR INITIAL
PHASE. IN INTERIM, FOLLOWING ARE TENTATIVE VIEWS FOR
YOUR POSSIBLE INFORMAL USE IN SUPPORT OF US OBJECTIVE:
WE HOPE TO AVOID LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURAL ISSUES
OR DISCUSSION OF AGENDA ALONG LINES ENVISAGED BY UK
"STEERING BRIEF" PAPER AT THE OUTSET OF NEGOTIATIONS.
AGENDA HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED DURING INITIAL VIENNA
TALKS. DISCUSSION THERE INDICATES THAT IT IS IMPROBABLE
THAT EAST WOULD COME TO EASY AGREEMENT ON AGENDA ACCEPT-
ABLE TO ALLIES. EARLY INTRODUCTION OF AN ALLIED FRAME-
WORK PROPOSAL ACCOMPLISHES WHAT AN ALLIED AGENDA PROPOSAL
CAN ACCOMPLISH, BUT HAS THE ADDED ADVANTAGE THAT IT WOULD
ALLOW THE ALLIES TO INFLUENCE TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT
FEASIBLE THE CONTENT AND DIRECTION OF NEGOTIATIONS.
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SOVIET AGREEMENT DURING VIENNA TALKS THAT "ANY TOPIC
RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT MATTER MAY BE INTRODUCED FOR
NEGOTIATION BY ANY OF THOSE STATES, WHICH WILL TAKE THE
NECESSARY DECISIONS" REPRESENTS IN OUR VIEW A SATISFACTORY
ALTERNATIVE TO A FORMALLY AGREED AGENDA, IN THE SENSE
THAT SOVIETS ARE ALREADY COMMITTED TO ADDRESS AND NEGOTI-
ATE ON ALLIED PROPOSALS.

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

4. OUR FIRST PRESENTATION OF A FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL WOULD PROBABLY BE GENERAL AND BROAD. SUCCEEDING TREATMENTS WOULD GO FURTHER INTO DETAIL. WE CAN OF COURSE EXPECT DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SOVIETS AS TO WHICH PARTS OF OUR FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL SHOULD BE TREATED FIRST, BUT UK PROPOSAL PROVIDING THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD HAVE RIGHT TO FOCUS ON SUBJECTS OF GREATEST INTEREST TO THEM IN PARALLEL WAY SHOULD PROVIDE SOLUTION. (FYI: UK ACTING PERM REP THOMSON HAS TOLD US INFORMALLY HE MIGHT ACCEPT ABOVE APPROACH. IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO DISCUSS IT WITH HIM TO SEE IF HE CAN GO ALONG. END FYI.)

5. IN ARGUING FOR EARLY TABLING OF ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL, YOU MAY DRAW ON FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. IF WE ARE SEEN TO BE STALLING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OR MERELY PLAYING A GAME, WE WILL DISCREDIT THE MBFR ENTERPRISE SO FAR AS THE PUBLIC IS CONCERNED. THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE SERIOUS AND HAVE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OTHERWISE WE COULD NOT EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO RESPOND MEANINGFULLY.

B. THE ALLIES MUST HAVE AN AGREED NEGOTIATING POSITION TO MAINTAIN THEIR COHESION AND SOLIDARITY DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. OTHERWISE, THEY WILL INEVITABLY BE DRIVEN TO PUT FORWARD INDIVIDUAL VIEWS. THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN FINDING OUT ABOUT ALLIED DIFFERENCES, AND IN EXPLOITING THEM.

C. THE SOVIETS COULD PUT FORWARD A PROPOSAL OF THEIR OWN AT AN EARLY STAGE. SUCH A PROPOSAL MIGHT HAVE STRONG APPEAL FOR PUBLIC OPINION, ESPECIALLY IF THE WEST HAD PUT FORWARD NO PROPOSAL OF ITS OWN.

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6. "COMMON FLOOR" CONCEPT: THE APPARENT UK VIEW IS THAT ALLIES SHOULD ESTABLISH A "COMMON FLOOR" OF ALLIED REDUCTIONS BELOW WHICH THERE WOULD BE DAMAGE TO NATO SECURITY ALMOST WITHOUT REGARD TO AMOUNT OF SOVIET REDUCTIONS, WITH IMPLICATION THAT THE US REDUCTION PROPOSAL EXCEEDS THESE LIMITS. IT IS OUR POSITION THAT REDUCTIONS ON THE ALLIED SIDE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO APPROXIMATELY TEN PERCENT IN TOTAL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. OUR ANALYSIS LEADS US TO BELIEVE THAT, GIVEN THE APPROPRIATE REDUCTIONS ON THE SOVIET SIDE, I.E. TO THE SAME LEVEL, ALLIED REDUCTIONS OF THIS SCOPE AND MAGNITUDE WOULD NOT IMPAIR THE ABILITY OF THE ALLIES TO IMPLEMENT THE NATO STRATEGY OF FORWARD DEFENSE, FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. THE SAME GOES FOR OUR PROPOSED REDUCTION OF US FORCES IN PHASE I. A TEN PERCENT LIMI-

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

TATION ON WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES, SUCH AS THE BRITISH
ARE PROPSING, COULD INHIBIT US FLEXIBILITY IN OB-
TAINING WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY, NOR DO WE WISH TO
PREJUDGE CONTEXT OF SECOND PHASE. IN THIS CONNECTION
MISSION SHOULD CONTINUE TO DRAW ON VIEWS IN PARAS 3-5 OF
STATE 152826 AS WELL AS ON RESPONSE MADE BY AMBASSADOR
RAMSFELD IN PARA 14 OF USNATO 3582.
S7. CONCEPT OF "EQUALITY": NETHERLANDS HAS QUESTIONED USE
WITH SOVIETS OF CONCEPT OF EQUALITY AS NEGOTIATING ARGUMENT.
WE RECOGNIZE THAT SOVIETS MAY PRESS FOR A LITERAL APPLICA-

TION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF "EQULITY" TO VARIOUS ASPECTS OF
AN MBFR AGREEMENT, INCLUDING REDUCTIONS. THE ALLIES WILL
WISH, HOWEVER, TO STRESS EQUALITY OF OUTCOMES (I.E.,
A COMMON CEILING) AS THE COMMON GOAL TO BE SOUGHT.
EMPHASIS ON THE ASYMMETRIES IN THE PRESENT SITUATION WILL
BE REQUIRED TO JUSTIFY THE ASYMMETRICAL FEATURES OF THE
REDUCTIONS SOUGHT BY THE ALLIES. AT THE SAME TIME, HOW-
EVER, THE ALLIES WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE EQUAL PERCENTAGE
ASPECT OF THEIR PHASE-ONE PROPOSAL--EQUAL PERCENTAGE RE-
DUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES--DOES EMBODY THE PRINCIPLE
OF EQUALITY. USE OF THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY DURING NEGO-
TIATIONS, WILL, THEREFORE, BE AN IMPORTANT AND POTENTIALLY
EFFECTIVE BARGAINING TOOL WHOSE NEGATIVE ASPECTS
APPEAR CONTROLABLE.

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8. PARITY IN COMBAT CAPABILITY AS AN ALLIED NEGOTIATING
OBJECTIVE: RE THIS UK POINT, GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN PARA
6 OF STATE 152826 CONTINUES TO APPLY. YOU SHOULD STRESS
THAT US PROPOSAL OF JULY 27 THAT ALLIES FOCUS ON
OBTAINING WITHDRAWAL OF ONE SOVIET TANK ARMY MEETS THE
BRITISH POINT.

9. TREATMENT OF NUCLEAR ELEMENTS: IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS
OF ITALIANS AND OTHERS: SINCE THE US HAS PROPOSED THAT
NUCLEAR ELEMENTS BE RESERVED, AND BROUGHT INTO NEGOTIA-
TIONS ONLY IF AND WHEN NEGOTIATING SITUATION CALLS FOR IT
(WITHIN LIMITS DEFINED IN APPROACH 3 OF US APRIL 30 PAPER),
IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO ATTEMPT TO DECIDE AT THIS POINT
JUST HOW THIS BARGAINING CHIP SHOULD BE USED OR WHICH AND
HOW MANY OF ITS COMPONENTS WOULD BE PUT FORWARD. WE WOULD
IN ANY EVENT WISH TO INSIST TO THE EAST THAT THE PRIMARY
FOCUS OF NEGOTIATIONS BE KEPT ON GROUND FORCES AND THAT
THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN FOCUS BE MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THE
NEGOTIATIONS.

10. NEOGITABILITY OF PHASE ONE PROPOSAL: IN MEETING
ARGUMENTS SUCH AS THOSE EXPRESSED BY THOMSON (PARA 10

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

(A) OF USNATO 3687) THAT US PROPOSAL IS TOO ASYMMETRICAL TO BE PLAUSIBLE, YOU MAY DRAW ON FOLLOWING POINTS (WHICH ARE NOT NECESSARILY INTENDED FOR INCLUSION IN SPC DRAFT):

(A) THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT PROVIDES AN EQUITABLE, OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF "EQUAL SECURITY", PARTICULARLY CONSIDERING SOVIET REINFORCING POTENTIAL FROM JUST OUTSIDE THE REDUCTION AREA.

(B) EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE ARE SURELY BALANCED IN THE BASIC SENSE; THE EXISTING FORCE RATIO WOULD BE UNCHANGED. AT THE SAME TIME BECAUSE OF THE LARGER SOVIET BASE, THE FIRST PHASE DOES CONSTITUTE A REAL STEP TOWARD AN OVERALL NATO/WP COMMON LEVEL.

(C) PROVISION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF A TANK ARMY TAKES ACCOUNT OF BOTH THE DISPROPORTIONATELY HEAVY SOVIET OFFENSIVE ARMOR CAPABILITY AND IS DEFENSIBLE ON THESE GROUNDS.

SECRET

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(D) PROVISION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY WHILE DETAILS OF US WITHDRAWAL ARE UNSPECIFIED TAKES ACCOUNT OF REINFORCEMENT ASYMMETRY AND AGAIN CAN BE DEFENDED ON THESE GROUNDS.

(E) FINALLY, WE RECOGNIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING TO ADD NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN THE NGA AS A BARGAINING COUNTER TO OBTAIN WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIET TANK ARMY.

11. DEGREE TO WHICH EAST SHOULD BE ASKED TO COMMIT ITSELF TO OVERALL ALLIED REDUCTION PROPOSAL AND LINKAGE TO SECOND PHASE: BEGIN FYI: WE ARE PREPARING SEPARATE MESSAGE ON QUESTION OF HOW THE ALLIES SHOULD PRESENT THEIR VIEWS ON OVERALL GOAL OF MBFR. END FYI.

12. SPECIFYING COMPOSITION OF SECOND PHASE: NETHERLANDS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT ALLIES MIGHT ESTABLISH SOME DEGREE OF CONSENSUS ON COMPOSITION OF SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS. WE BELIEVE OUR RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED IN JULY 27 PAPER ON REDUCTION COMPONENT OF ALLIED POSITION SHOULD FORM BASIS FOR "BROAD CONSENSUS" ON NATURE OF SECOND PHASE WHICH IS SUFFICIENT FOR PRESENT NEEDS. SUCH AN ALLIED CONSENSUS WOULD ENTAIL AGREEMENT ONLY ON TOTAL FIGURES AND ON INCLUSION OF OTHER NATO FORCES ON THE WESTERN SIDE AS A MAJOR COMPONENT OF SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS. WE CONSIDER IT HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE TO GO BEYOND THIS AT PRESENT TIME SINCE IT IS UNLIKELY ALLIED GOVERNMENTS ARE PREPARED TO TAKE DETAILED DECISIONS ON COMPOSITION OF SECOND PHASE NOW AND

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

THIS ISSUE MIGHT WELL DOMINATE DISCUSSION OF FIRST PHASE. WE BELIEVE POSITION ALONG THESE LINES SHOULD MEET THE PUBLIC NEEDS OF ALL INTERESTED ALLIES DURING PHASE ONE NEGOTIATIONS.

13. PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES: ON THIS QUESTION, YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE GUIDED BY US POSITION THAT EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THESE PROPOSALS WILL NOT BE A PRECONDITION TO NEGOTIATING REDUCTIONS. WE ARE, OF COURSE, PREPARED TO SEEK TO NEGOTIATE CONSTRAINTS PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS. TO THIS END, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE TACTICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS FOR THE ALLIES TO TABLE A DETAILED PRO-
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POSAL EARLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, SOON AFTER PRESENTATION OF THE ALLIES' OVERALL NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK. WE ARE PREPARING A DRAFT FOR PRESENTATION TO THE ALLIES IN THE NEAR FUTURE. BEGIN FYI: WE HOPE TO HAVE DETAILED PROPOSAL READY BY END OF AUGUST. END FYI.

14. AS WE ENVISAGE THEM, THREE OF THE FOUR PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES WE HAVE PROPOSED WOULD APPLY TO OTHER ALLIED FORCES ON THE WESTERN SIDE AND TO NON-SOVIET WP FORCES ON THE EASTERN SIDE AS WELL AS US AND SOVIET FORCES. AGREEMENT BY ALL THE "DIRECT PARTICIPANTS" IN NEGOTIATIONS TO THESE CONSTRAINTS WOULD GIVE A MULTILATERAL DIMENSION TO THE PHASE-ONE MBFR AGREEMENT. OUR GOAL IS, OF COURSE, PRIMARILY TO CONSTRAIN SOVIET FORCES, NOT ALLIED FORCES. WE HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD AT A MINIMUM DEMAND RECIPROCAL APPLICATION OF CONSTRAINTS TO ALLIED FORCES. WE ARE PREPARED, FOR OUR PART, TO ACCEPT THE APPLICATION TO US FORCES IN THE NGA OF THE CONSTRAINTS WE HAVE

PROPOSED. THE ALLIES WILL NEED TO DECIDE WHETHER THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THEM ON THEIR OWN FORCES. BEGIN FYI: A POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING POSITION, IF THE ALLIES PREFER, MIGHT BE TO PUT FORWARD THE CONCEPT OF PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS ON US AND SOVIET FORCES ONLY, HOLDING IN RESERVE THE POSSIBILITY OF AGREEING TO APPLY THEM TO OTHER ALLIED FORCES AS WELL. END FYI.

15. WE CONSIDER THAT THE AREA FOR PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS AND FOR REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE IDENTICAL. TO PROPOSE A WIDER CONSTRAINTS AREA WOULD RISK WIDENING THE GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND POSSIBLY LEAD TO SOVIET DEMANDS THAT ALLIED FORCES LOCATED OUTSIDE CENTRAL EUROPE BE INCLUDED IN NEGOTIATIONS. INCLUDING SOVIET WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS IN ALLIED PROPOSAL COULD LEAD TO UNACCEPTABLE SOVIET DEMANDS FOR RECIPROCITY OUTSIDE NGA IN WEST. BEGIN FYI: SINCE GERMANS, WHO HAVE

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

BEEN CHIEF PROPONENT OF WIDER CONSTRAINTS AREA, NOW
APPEAR SATISFIED WITH OUR POSITION, YOU SHOULD ATTEMPT
TO ENLIST THEIR SUPPORT IN RESISTING EFFORTS TO EXPAND
CONSTRAINT AREA BEYOND POINT ABOVE. END FYI.

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16. VERIFICATION: WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE RAISED BY
THE UK AND OTHERS WHETHER THE ALLIES SHOULD PROPOSE THAT
PHASE ONE REDUCTIONS BE VERIFIED BY NATIONAL MEANS ONLY, OR
WHETHER THE ALLIES SHOULD PUT FORWARD MULTILATERAL MEASURES
OF INSPECTION, YOU MAY MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A) THE SOVIETS HAVE RESISTED ON-SITE INSPECTION MEASURES
IN THE PAST, AND THE CHANCES OF OBTAINING SOVIET AGREE-
MENT TO SUCH MEASURES IN THE MBFR CONTEXT SEEM SMALL. IF
THE SOVIETS SHOULD AGREE TO CONSIDER SOME FORM OF IN-
SPECTION, THEY WILL CERTAINLY DEMAND A HIGH PRICE IN
RETURN.

B) GIVEN THE EUROPEAN INTEREST IN THIS QUESTION, WE ARE
WILLING, NEVERTHELESS, TO EXPLORE THE SOVIET POSITION.

C) AT THE SAME TIME, BECAUSE THE PHASE ONE REDUCTION
GOAL PROPOSED IN THE US JULY 27 PAPER IS CONSIDERED
VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL MEANS, OUR ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT AS
REGARDS VERIFICATION WOULD BE SOVIET AGREEMENT ON NON
INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THEREFORE,
THIS MEETS THE POSITION IN THE APRIL 30 US PAPER THAT WE
MUST BE PREPARED TO RELY ON NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION
--ALONG WITH A NONINTERFERENCE PROVISION--FOR ANY PROPROS-
ALS WE AGREE TO. AT THE SAME TIME WE ARE PREPARED TO
CONSIDER PROPOSING NEGOTIATED INSPECTION MEASURES. THESE
COULD INCREASE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND THUS CONTRIBUTE

TO MONITORING POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS AND TO IMPROV-
ING WARNING CAPABILITIES.

D) THE US WILL IN THE NEAR FUTURE TABLE IN NATO A PAPER ON
VERIFICATION FOR ALLIANCE CONSIDERATION. BEGIN FYI: WE
ARE CURRENTLY EDITING FOR NATO USE THE TEXT OF A CIA STUDY
OF THE INSPECTION MEASURES LISTED IN THE US PAPER OF
APRIL 30, WHICH WE EXPECT TO BE AVAILABLE BEFORE THE END
OF AUGUST. END FYI.

17. NON-CIRCUMVENTION: WE WILL ADVANCE FOR ALLIED CON-
SIDERATION PROPOSALS ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION AT THE APPROPRI-
ATE TIME. AS INDICATED IN THE US PAPER, THIS WILL PROBABLY

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Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

BE AT A LATER STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THE OUTLINE OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT HAS BEGUN TO TAKE DEFINITE SHAPE. IT IS EVIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT THE QUESTION OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION MUST ALSO CONSIDER POSSIBLE IMPACT ON SOUTHERN FLANK AS WELL AS A MEANS OF PREVENTING A SOVIET BUILD-UP IN HUNGARY. IT CAN BE ENVISAGED, THEREFORE, THAT A REDUCTION AGREEMENT MIGHT INCLUDE A GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION.

18. FLANK ISSUE: WE CAN ACCEPT TURKISH SUGGESTION (PARA 5, USNATO 3687) THAT ALLIES SHOULD AGREE THAT REDUCTIONS WOULD BE "WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE." HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT SINCE THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE IS STRICTLY AN INTERNAL ALLIANCE MATTER, THIS PROPOSITION WOULD NOT BE ADVANCED IN NEGOTIATIONS TO THE SOVIETS FOR THEIR ASSENT.

19. NOMENCLATURE: WE AGREE WITH CANADIAN AND DUTCH SUGGESTION THAT ALLIES MIGHT DROP USE OF TERMS "STATIONED-INDIGENOUS", AND INSTEAD ADOPT TERM "US" AND "OTHER NATO" AND "SOVIET" AND "OTHER WP" IN REFERRING TO FORCES.

20. ALLIED FLEXIBILITY DURING NEGOTIATIONS: YOU SHOULD PRESS TO HAVE INCORPORATED INTO SECTION 3 OF THE SPC PAPER AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF THE LANGUAGE OF PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 23 OF OUR JULY 27 PAPER, BEARING ON THE NEED FOR ALLIED FLEXIBILITY DURING NEGOTIATIONS.

21. DATA BASE: FYI: WE ARE PREPARING SEPARATE MESSAGE WITH SUGGESTIONS ON HOW QUESTION OF DATA SHOULD BE HANDLED. END FYI.

22. PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY: WE RECOGNIZE THAT QUESTION OF HOW THE ALLIES WOULD PRESENT AND DEFEND THEIR POSITIONS IN PUBLIC IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE NEGOTIATION IS AN IMPORTANT AND DIFFICULT ONE. WE BELIEVE THAT GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION SHOULD BE ADDRESSED DURING DISCUSSION OF SECTION THREE OF ALLIED POSITION PAPER, RECOGNIZING THAT PARTICULAR DECISIONS RECONCILING THE NEED TO KEEP THE PUBLIC INFORMED WITH THE NEED TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS MAY

HAVE TO BE TAKEN FROM TIME TO TIME ON AN AD HOC BASIS, AS THE NEED ARISES.

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

23. NATO MILITARY INPUT: WE EXPECT AND WELCOME INPUT BY NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN SPC DISCUSSIONS. WE DO NOT NOW SEE NEED FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION IN NAC OF THIS SUBJECT, HOWEVER. ROGERS

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EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

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